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## LOCALMULTIDEM

Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants' Social Capital in Europe:  
Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level

SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT (STREP)

PRIORITY 7: Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society

### **Deliverable #7**

### **Integrated report on the Institutional Political Opportunity Structure**

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#### **Dissemination Level**

<b>PU</b>	Public	
<b>PP</b>	Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)	
<b>RE</b>	Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)	<b>X</b>
<b>CO</b>	Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)	

## **Summary**

This report systematically explores a broad set of indicators impacting upon migrants' political integration, and which can be taken together to assess the overall institutional and political opportunity structures across different cities. While the analysis is based on the local level of the city, many parameters are in fact defined by the national legislation (essentially the legal ones, which are largely present in this study). In particular, six cities are considered: Budapest, London (North, 4 boroughs), Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. The sub-local level of boroughs/cities of the Lyon urban area are also taken into account and differentiated when there are substantial variations amongst them.

The immigration backgrounds of the six cities are different from each other, mainly in terms of immigration tradition and of origins of the migrants themselves. London, Zurich and Lyon have undergone a post-war immigration wave that was quite massive. In the three cities, the main origin of immigration varies: European in Zurich, from the former colonies in London (mostly from South-Asia) and in Lyon (Algerians in particular). In Milan and Madrid, immigration has increased only since the 1980s. In Madrid, immigrants come mainly from Latin America. Lastly, immigration is even more recent and still very limited in Budapest, where Ethnic-Hungarians constitute the largest group. It should be said that in each city our analysis has focused on three different ethnic or national-origin groups, thus keeping with the objective to further comparison not only across different political contexts, but also across different groups in the same city.

This report is based on the information collected through the city reports (Deliverable #5), and focuses on different dimensions (articulated in the Workpackage guidelines in Deliverable #1). The first refers to immigrants' individual rights, in particular rights related to the access to the community (permits of stay, access to nationality), socio-economic, anti-discrimination and local political rights. The second dimension concerns group rights: it analyzes cultural constraints as well as collective resources and rights immigrants are experiencing in the host country at the local level. Thirdly, the political opportunity structure is considered, both general (local configuration of powers and political participation arrangements) and specific to immigrants (policies towards immigrants and immigrants' associations). Table 1 provides an overall summary of these three dimensions.

Table 1. Main dimensions of the institutional POS

Table 1. Main dimensions of the institutional POS	Budapest	London	Lyon	Madrid	Milan	Zurich
<b>Individual rights</b>	-General score: <b>-0,18</b> -Ethnic-Hungarians: <b>- 0,18</b> -Chinese: <b>- 0,22</b> -Muslims: <b>- 0,22</b>	-General score: <b>0,1</b> -African Caribbean: <b>0,1</b> -Bangladeshi: <b>0,1</b> -Indian: <b>0,1</b>	-General score: <b>0,29</b> -Algerians: <b>0,29</b> -Tunisians: <b>0,24</b> -Italians: <b>0,72</b>	-General score: <b>0,09</b> -Moroccans: <b>0,04</b> -Ecuadorians: <b>0,09</b> -Andean mixed group: <b>0,09</b>	-General score: <b>-0,07</b> -Filipinos: <b>-0,07</b> -Egyptians: <b>-0,07</b> -Ecuadorians: <b>-0,07</b>	-General score: <b>-0,04</b> -Turks: <b>-0,19</b> -Kosovars: <b>-0,19</b> -Italians: <b>-0,04</b>
<b>Cultural / group-rights</b>	-General score: <b>-0,08</b> -Ethnic-Hungarians: <b>-0,08</b> -Chinese: <b>-0,08</b> -Muslims: <b>-0,08</b>	-General score: <b>0,47</b> -African Caribbean: <b>0,31</b> -Bangladeshi: <b>0,47</b> -Indian: <b>0,47</b>	-General score: <b>0,08</b> -Algerians: <b>0,08</b> -Tunisians: <b>0,08</b> -Italians: <b>0,08</b>	-General score: <b>0,33</b> -Moroccans: <b>0,25</b> -Ecuadorians: <b>0,33</b> -Andean mixed group: <b>0,33</b>	-General score: <b>-0,28</b> -Filipinos: <b>-0,28</b> -Egyptians: <b>-0,28</b> -Ecuadorians: <b>-0,28</b>	-General score: <b>0,06</b> -Turks: <b>0,06</b> -Kosovars: <b>0,06</b> -Italians: <b>0,06</b>
<b>General POS</b>	-General score: <b>0,32</b>	-General score: <b>-0,13<sup>1</sup></b> -Camden and Islington: <b>0</b> -Hackney and Haringey: <b>-0,25</b>	-General score: <b>-0,02</b> -Caluire-et-Cuire + others: <b>-0,37</b> -Lyon city, Meyzieu, Pierre-Bénite, Vaulx-en-Velin, Villeurbanne + others : <b>-0,02</b>	-General score: <b>0,3</b>	-General score: <b>0,05</b>	-General score: <b>0,1</b>
<b>Specific POS</b>	-General score: <b>-0,53</b>	-General score: <b>0,62</b>	-General score: <b>-0,3</b> -Lyon city: <b>-0,3</b> -Villeurbanne: <b>-0,5</b> -Others: <b>-0,9</b>	-General score: <b>0,22</b>	-General score: <b>-0,25</b>	-General score: <b>0,22</b>

<sup>1</sup> In case of differences between areas of a same city, the basic rule to build the general score for the whole city would be to use a statistical principle (considering the more populated area), as we did when there are differences between groups. We used such a principle for Lyon (using Lyon city as the basis because it has the most numerous population), but we could not for Northern London as we do not have such information for the moment.

The table above was built considering the following elements:

- A general score representing the situation of the “typical migrant” in the city (taking into account the largest or set of largest minority groups) is included in order to have an overall image of the migrants’ situation in each city;
- Whenever we found differences between areas of a single city, the general score for the whole city has been assigned with the most populated area(s) in mind. In the case of London we have calculated an average between the 4 boroughs.
- Individual rights: the average is based on the 8 dimensions of this category: 1) access to short-term permits, 2) access to long-term permits, 3) access to family reunion, 4) access to nationality, 5) labour market access, 6) welfare state access, 7) anti-discrimination rights, and 8) political rights;
- Cultural/group-rights: the average is based on the 6 dimensions of this category: 1) cultural requirements to access the community, 2) language programs, 3) schooling, 4) religion, 5) media, 6) labour market: group rights;
- General political opportunity structure: the average is based on the 2 main dimensions of this category: 1) configuration of powers; 2) participation mechanisms (for the details of the indicators included in each of these dimensions, see section III).
- Specific political opportunity structure: the average is based on the 5 main dimensions of this category: 1) degree of development of migrants’ integration policy at the local level, 2) political representation of migrants, 3) attitude of local powers towards minority/migrants’ organizations, 4) attitude of local powers towards organizations whose activity is specialized in/has an impact on immigration/integration issues, 5) political backing of anti-immigrant and radical right parties (for the details of the indicators included in each of these dimensions, see section IV).

Regarding individual rights, the situation is relatively restrictive in 3 cities: Milan, Zurich and Budapest. This is mainly related to the quite high economic requirements that are imposed to immigrants to access the community and to restricted conditions for accessing citizenship, either regarding economic requirements (Hungary), the access of second-generation immigrants (Hungary and Italy) or the conditions related to the length of previous residence (especially Switzerland). Madrid (Spain) is situated in an intermediary situation: the conditions for accessing short-term permits are quite restrictive whereas the regimes for long-

term residence and naturalization are quite open. In London (UK), and especially in Lyon (France), immigrants undergo a more favourable context, essentially connected to the open systems existing for the access to nationality. However, the welfare state access and economic requirements for the access to short-term permits are quite restricted in the UK compared to France, while in this latter case the open situation that can be noted is essentially linked to the fact that the specific provisions existing for the three groups taken into account (Algerians, Italians, and Tunisians) are much more favourable than for migrants from other countries of origin. Moreover, the liberal nature of the system is also connected to the specific nature of immigration in France, which is mainly based on family immigration. It must also be noted that the configuration regarding political rights is much more open for some groups and cities, for example due to the process of European integration (for example, Italians in Lyon), to the links between countries and their former colonies (the 3 investigated groups in London, who are immigrants from the Commonwealth countries), or because of specific favourable regulations (long-term residents in Budapest but only for voting rights, with no eligibility in local elections).

As regards cultural and group-rights, the overall picture shows limited opportunities for immigrants. The only exceptions in this field are Madrid and, especially, London. In this latter city, the recognition of cultural diversity and the implementation of policies that are specific to disadvantaged ethnic groups are very developed. In Madrid, the system is also relatively open, since policies in favour of the immigrant population as a whole group have emerged, for example in the labour market sphere or in the media (programs for immigrants). Moreover, there is a moderate toleration, in the absence of any regulation about this, of Islamic religious signs. However, the absence of cultural requirements for the access to permits to stay and citizenship must also be related to the fact that most immigrants in Madrid are culturally close to the majority group as they come from Latin America, and thus share the language and –generally- the religious background. In Budapest, the attitudes towards Islam are also quite favourable, since Muslim groups benefit from the liberal legislation previously set up in the early 1990s to recognize specific cultural rights to long-established national minorities. Yet, specific policies targeting immigrants themselves are only marginally developed, especially in the labour market. In all others cities, the cultural and collective rights granted to immigrants, and to a higher extent to specific ethnic groups, are very rare.

The general political opportunity structure can be unpacked into two main components: the configuration of powers (essentially related to the level of decentralization and the powers granted to local authorities, as well as the degree of proportionality of the electoral system) and participation mechanisms (referenda, individual citizens' right to participate and relations between the local powers and the civil society organizations). These two components are considered to be independent. As regards the first one, the situation is more closed in Lyon and Milan due to both the limited decentralization (at the national and local levels) and the low level of proportionality of the electoral system. In Madrid and Zurich, electoral systems are purely proportional but the decentralization, strong at the national level, is limited or inexistent in the city. As for London and Budapest, their situation is somewhat in the middle as they combine a mixed electoral system, differentiating the districts and the whole city, with a high decentralization at the local level (and a high centralization at the national level, especially in Hungary).

Focusing on the second component, two main groups of cities can be identified. The first group (London, Zurich, Caluire-et-Cuire and some other cities of the Lyon urban areas) is characterized by restrictive or limited political participative systems, in terms of individual citizens' rights to participate and/or civil society organizations' involvement in local policies. The case of Zurich is specific as it combines very open referenda procedures and popular initiatives with some other marginal channels for participation, both for citizens and for organizations. The second group of cities (Madrid, Lyon city, Milan and Budapest) are characterized by a more favourable situation. The general political opportunity structure is particularly open in Milan and Budapest, regarding referenda procedures, the pluralist character of the participation system, and regulations concerning citizen participation.

As regards the specific political opportunity structure, the case of London needs to be singled out as it is the only city to support extensively ethnic organizations and ethnic groups, involving them in local policies, within an overall framework of local community cohesion agenda. The local authorities of Madrid and Zurich have recently started to promote immigrants' involvement in the local public sphere and have developed consultative bodies. They are also implementing local immigrants' integration policies. In Milan and Budapest, lastly, the policies related to immigrants' integration are inexistent (Budapest) or only slightly

developed, while the place of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the local policies is clearly marginal. The case of Lyon is useful to test the traditional French reluctance towards ethnic-defined organizations and political projects that has often been treated in scholarly work. The representation of foreigners through the creation of a new advisory council (whose composition notably takes into account the weight of each ethnic group in the city) in Lyon city represents a significant (though still isolated) shift.

## Comparative analysis based on the policy/issue areas

### I – Individual rights

#### 1. Access to the community


##### a. Conditions of stay: short-term / long-term residence and family reunion

##### Short-term permits

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
1	Automatic acquisition of the permit if mother or father of a national minor child	No such a provision exists or further conditions apply  London, Madrid, Zurich	Only if she/he contributes financially to the child 's raising and if the child is unmarried <i>and/or</i> with economic requirements  Budapest	More open conditions  Lyon, Milan
2	Automatic acquisition of the permit if marriage with a national	No such a provision exists or further conditions apply (length of marriage > 1 year)	If length of marriage is at least = 1 year <i>and/or</i> with economic requirements  Budapest	More open conditions (no condition of length of marriage, no economic requirements...) London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
3	Economic resources requirement	Additional requirements (for example accommodation requirements as well)  Budapest, London, Milan	-At least the level of the minimal social income (provided by the welfare state to support the poorest people)	More open conditions  Lyon, Madrid, Zurich,
4	Link between work regime and permit regime	Obligation to first have a work contract to stay on the territory Budapest, London, Milan, Zurich (Turks and Kosovars)	Obligation only for some economic sectors  Madrid	Possibility to stay in the territory without work contract, to search for a job Lyon, Zurich (Italians)
5	Grounds for withdrawal: a. proven fraud in the acquisition of permit b. sentence for serious crimes c. actual and serious threat to public policy or national security d. sufficient level of resources	Grounds include d <i>or</i> other than a-b-c Budapest, London, Lyon (Tunisians), Milan, Madrid, Zurich	Grounds include c but not d Lyon (Algerians)	No other than a-b  Lyon (Italians)



### Access to short-term permits



Regarding the access to the territory and, in particular, the requirements to obtain short-term permits, there is some variation between the six cities; however, the general picture is one of substantial restrictiveness of the situation, which can mainly be connected to the demanding economic requirements that newcomers have to comply with. In this respect, Lyon represents a particular case. Family members of nationals represent the major source of immigration today (45 % of immigration flows) and economic requirements do not apply for them (contrary to family members of settled foreigners). This places Lyon in a specific situation compared to other cities where the immigration can be of a different kind and/or economic conditions are imposed to all kinds of immigrants. In London, Milan and Budapest, having sufficient resources constitutes a prerequisite to get the short-term permit for all categories of immigrants and also is a ground for withdrawing it. Yet, no fixed amount is defined, apart from the case of Milan where the level legally defined is not so high (equivalent to the minimum social income) but supplemented by accommodation requirements. In Zurich or Madrid, as the immigration is mainly a labour one, it is assumed that immigrants would provide for themselves and hence the level of economic resources is not an official criterion for the issue of the permit. Nevertheless, the failure to demonstrate sufficient resources (the level of which not being precisely defined in the legislation) or the fact of being unemployed are motives for revoking the short-term permit.

Family links with nationals represent a privileged entrance door to European cities. With regard to people married with nationals, a common trend can be noted: in every country/city, their specific right to access the territory is recognized, in general without any economic requirements (except in Budapest). This is not the same for parents of nationals: their right is fully recognized in two cities (Lyon and Milan), while it is accompanied by the usual economic requirements in Budapest, and it is not even admitted in Zurich and Madrid. In London, demanding additional criteria are stipulated (being the main carer, being the partner of the parent residing in the UK, being accommodated without recourse to public funds). In all cities, there also is a strong link between work regime and permit regime. Again, the situation of Lyon is different due to the nature of its immigration. The major part of

immigrants going to Lyon access the territory as family members, and thereby have the right to work without getting first any work contract/permit. In others cities, some groups constitute exceptions: for example, Italian immigrants in Zurich, as EEA nationals, as well as descendents of people of Spanish origin and workers in sectors with skills shortages in Madrid can get a short-term permit to search for a job.

As regards grounds for withdrawing the status, they are widely common from one city to another. All the legislations show the importance of security concerns, since a sentence for serious crimes or the fact of representing a threat to public policy or national security are reasons for permit withdrawal in all cities. In Lyon, recent modifications of the law have introduced infringements of the immigration law (hiring a foreigner without work permit for example) as well as offences revealing cultural concerns (polygamous family reunion) as grounds for withdrawal. But in principle, these additional conditions do not apply to Algerians because their situation is ruled by a specific bilateral agreement that is older. Regarding Tunisians, polygamy is mentioned as a possible ground in the bilateral agreement. In both cases, having insufficient resources is not relevant in the majority of cases. By contrast, the level of resources is considered as a ground for revoking the permit in all other cities (Budapest, London, Madrid, Milan and Zurich).

#### Long-term permits

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
6	Acquisition of the permit if mother or father of a national minor child	No such a provision exists or further conditions apply <i>London, Madrid, Zurich</i>	If length of residence is >2 <5 years (with or without economic requirements)	More open conditions (required time of residence shorter, etc.) <i>Budapest, Lyon, Milan</i>
7	Acquisition of the permit if marriage with a national	Further conditions <i>Zurich</i>	If length of marriage >2 < 5 years and/or if length of residence >2 < 5 years (with or without economic requirements)	More open conditions of length of marriage and/or of length of residence (with or without economic requirements) <i>London, Budapest, Lyon, Milan, Madrid</i>
8	Required minimum time of habitual residence	> 6 years <i>Zurich (Turks and Kosovars)</i>	> 4 ≤ 6 years <i>London, Milan, Madrid, Zurich (Italians)</i>	≤ 4 years <i>Budapest, Lyon</i>
9	Economic resources requirement	Additional requirements (for example accommodation requirements as well) <i>Budapest, London, Milan</i>	At least the level of the minimal social income (provided by the welfare state to support the poorest people) <i>Zurich</i>	More open conditions <i>Lyon, Madrid</i>
10	Percentage of given permits over the total number of applications – National Level	< 50 %	≥ 50 < 80 % <i>Budapest</i>	≥ 80 % <i>London, Madrid</i>
11	Grounds for withdrawal: a. proven fraud in the acquisition of permit	Grounds include d or other than a-b-c	Grounds include c but not d	No other than a-b



economic requirements to access the status (except in Madrid), but once granted, insufficient resources cannot constitute a ground for withdrawal. Hence long-term residents are entitled to recourse to public funds and social security. The case of Budapest is specific: while the residence requirements are very favourable (3 years), especially for Ethnic Hungarians (no condition of residence), the economic situation of immigrants is not only a criterion for the issue of the long-term permit but also for the potential withdrawal.

As regards the situation in Lyon, the very open regime is connected to the nature of immigration, both in terms of the source of immigration (family reunions) and main origins of immigrants (EU and North-African country nationals). Algerians and Tunisians benefit from much more favourable conditions regarding residence (only 3 years instead of 5 years in the general regime). As for Italians, the recent modifications of legislation (2003 and 2006 laws transposing EU directives in this field) make it possible to stay in the territory without any permit to stay. While the French law states that EU non-working immigrants must have “sufficient resources”, this requirement is rather theoretical and difficult to scrutinise. Moreover, as third-nationals immigrating to Lyon are mainly family members (of nationals or settled foreigners), they do not have, in France, to fulfil any economic requirements to access long-term residence, whereas other kinds of immigrants (workers, visitors, and so on) must have stable resources at least equivalent to the level of the “SMIC” (the legal minimum wage, that is, 984 euros net per month) without recourse to public funds.

Again, cities share many common rules. Persons married with nationals are in a very privileged situation and benefit from a facilitated access to long-term residence (1 year of residence instead of 3 for Algerians and Tunisians in Lyon, 2 years instead of 3 for non-Ethnic-Hungarians in Budapest, 2 years instead of 5 in the London, 5 years instead of 10 in Zurich) or even a direct access (in Madrid and Milan). As noted for short-term permits, the grounds for withdrawal are quite similar in the 6 cities and essentially connected to security concerns. The situation in Lyon is specific as the recent changes in the legislation have considerably hardened the provisions related to withdrawal, introducing grounds based on the non-respect for the immigration law or for the public authority and property but also reasons linked to cultural considerations (polygamy, violence against minors causing mutilations, which is clearly aimed at excisions). Nevertheless, these new grounds do not apply, theoretically, to Algerians and Tunisians, on account of the specific regulations existing in their case.


In only three cities (London, Madrid and Lyon), preclusion of expulsion exists for some categories of long-term residents (residents living in the host country for 20 years in Lyon and Madrid, born in the host country, and/or minors). However, this liberal provision is offset by legal limitations: serious criminal activities in Lyon and London and threat to national security in the three cities.

## Family reunion

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
19	Eligibility for legal residents	≥ 2 years of legal residence <i>and/or</i> holding a permit for ≥ 2 years	> 1 year of legal residence <i>and/or</i> holding a permit for > 1 year <b>Lyon (Algerians and Tunisians)</b>	≤ 1 year of legal residence <i>and/or</i> holding a residence permit for ≤ 1 year <b>Budapest, London, Lyon (Italians), Madrid, Milan, Zurich</b>
20	Economic resources requirement	Additional requirements (for example accommodation requirements as well) <b>Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich</b>	At least the level of the minimal social income (provided by the welfare state to support the poorest people)	More open conditions
21	Duration of validity of permit	≤ 1 year renewable permit <i>or</i> new application necessary  <b>Zurich</b>	-Depends on sponsor's permit (but not equal to it ) <i>or</i> -> 1 year renewable permit but not equal to sponsor's -≤ 1 year permit but possibility to apply for a long-term permit after ≤ 2 years of residence <b>Budapest, London, Madrid</b>	Equal to sponsor's residence permit and renewable  <b>Lyon, Milan</b>
22	Grounds for withdrawing: a. Public policy or security major threat b. Proven fraud in the acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship or misleading information). c. Break-up of family relationship (before three years)	Other grounds  <b>London, Lyon (Tunisians), Madrid</b>	Grounds include c  <b>Budapest, Milan, Zurich</b>	No other than a-b  <b>Lyon (Algerians/Italians)</b>
23	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	After > 5 years <i>or</i> upon certain conditions	After > 3 ≤ 5 years  <b>Budapest, Madrid (partners), Zurich</b>	After ≤ 3 years  <b>London, Lyon, Milan (children), Madrid (children)</b>
24	Percentage of entrances in the territory through family reunion over the total number of applications – National level	< 50 %	≥ 50 < 80 %	≥ 80 %

The situations of the different cities are closer as far as the rules for family reunion are concerned, partly because the harmonization movement set up in the European Union in this field over the last years has contributed to reduce the differences between some EU cities. The right to family reunion is recognized in all cities. A quite liberal system is enforced as far as conditions of residence are concerned: the required sponsor's legal residence in the host country generally does not exceed one year (Milan, Madrid) or is even inexistent (Budapest, London, Zurich). The only exception is Lyon, where it has been extended very recently, in July 2006, in a context of overall hardening of the immigration laws.

However, this overall quite liberal situation is offset by strong economic requirements: sufficient resources for the whole family as well as a decent accommodation are required in all cities. The national legislations generally do not define any specific amount, apart from for Lyon where it is quite high (at least equivalent to the SMIC) and in Milan where it is low (equivalent to the minimal social assistance income, that is, around 375 euro per month). Only Italian immigrants in Zurich (as other EEA nationals) undergo a privileged situation as no economic condition is applied to them.



The situation of the investigated cities are more contrasted regarding the duration of validity of family members' permits and the grounds for their withdrawal. In the Madrid, London and Budapest, long-term residence permits can be accessed only after a certain period (one year in the London and Budapest). In Lyon and Milan, the right to residence of family members is equivalent to the sponsor's, that is, family members can directly get a long-term residence

permit if the sponsor holds one. In Zurich, the family members' permits are granted only for one year and renewable.

Regarding the reasons for withdrawing the family reunion-related permits, the systems are quite restrictive overall. Only Algerians in Lyon undergo a fairly favourable situation because the special regulation applying to them does not mention grounds such as illegal or polygamous family reunion and break-up of family relationship. Italians in Lyon also constitute a particular case since their family members can enter and stay without any permit. The failure to maintain and accommodate themselves constitutes a ground for withdrawal in the 2 cities: London and Madrid. In all cities, the break-up of the family relationship entails a possible withdrawal of the permit.

Family members' right to autonomous residence are more or less liberal from one city to another. In Budapest, partners can access a permit independently from the sponsor after 5 years. They can also do so before if they fulfil the conditions to obtain a permit related to another purpose of stay (such as work); this rule also applies in Milan. In Madrid and Lyon, the conditions to get a long-term permit autonomously do not differ from the general case (3 years for Algerians and Tunisians in Lyon, 5 years in Madrid). This required time is reduced to 2 years instead of 5 in London and 5 years instead of 10 in Zurich. Regarding children, they access an autonomous permit at the majority age without condition of residence in Milan, Zurich and Madrid.

## b. Nationality

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
13	Eligibility for second and third generation immigrants ( <i>jus soli</i> )	Further requirements (continuous residence since birth, etc.)  Budapest, Milan, Zurich	On application at a certain age (16/18 years, or before if parents can ask for their child) and with a condition of length of residence: ≤ 5 years Lyon, Madrid	Automatically at birth  London
14	Marriage with a national	Further conditions	If length of marriage >3 ≤ 5 years and/or if length of residence >3 ≤ 5 (with or without economic requirements)  Lyon, Zurich	More open conditions of length of marriage and/or of length of residence (with or without economic requirements) Budapest, London, Madrid, Milan
15	Required minimum time of habitual residence	> 8 years Madrid (Moroccans), Milan, Zurich	> 5 ≤ 8 years Budapest (Chinese, Muslims)	≤ 5 years Budapest (Ethnic Hungarians), London, Lyon, Madrid (Ecuadorians, Andean Mixed Group)
16	Economic resources requirement for naturalization (first generation immigrants)	Additional requirements (for example accommodation requirements as well)  Budapest, Lyon	At least the level of the minimal social income (provided by the welfare state to support the poorest people) Zurich	More open conditions  London, Madrid, Milan

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
17	Percentage of approved naturalizations over the total number of applications – National level Milan and Zurich: N.A.	< 50 %	≥ 50 < 80 %  London, Lyon	≥ 80 %  Budapest, Madrid (presumably)
18	Grounds for withdrawing status: a. proven fraud in the acquisition of citizenship b. actual and serious threat to public policy or national security Milan: N.A.	Other than a-b  Lyon, Madrid	No other than a-b  London, Zurich	No other than a  Budapest


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Regarding the access to the nationality of second generation immigrants, there are still some significant variations between the 6 cities. A common general trend can be observed in all cities, with the exception of Milan: the recognition of a privileged situation regarding the access to residence. However, this common recognition covers different situations, more or less open, going from the full recognition of second generation immigrants' right to citizenship to a mere facilitated process of the naturalization. The most open configuration is that of the UK, a country remaining emblematic of the *jus soli*. While a slight dose of *jus sanguini* was introduced in 1981, partly linking the citizenship of the person to that of one of his/her parents, the legislation remains nowadays predominated by the *jus soli*: a person born in Britain can acquire British citizenship at birth if one of his/her parents is a legal resident in the country. Legislations in Lyon and Madrid represent an intermediary situation, since citizenship is granted at the age of majority or a few years before with quite open conditions of residence, especially in Madrid (only 1 year). In the 3 other cities, the legislation is far more restrictive. In Budapest and Zurich, second generation immigrants only benefit from a facilitated naturalization. The condition of residence is reduced to 5 years instead of 8 in Budapest. In Zurich, the years between the age of 10 and 20 double count in the calculation of the length of residence, which must be equivalent to 12 years in total; moreover, there is a requirement of 2 years of residence in the same canton, and not in the same commune as in the general case. In Milan, second generation immigrants have the right to access the Italian nationality at the majority age but only if they have lived in the country without interruption since their birth. Symbolically and in practice, the fact of recognizing a *full access* to nationality for second generation immigrants (independently of conditions of residence), in cities such as London or Lyon, is of great importance. But one must also pay attention to the criterion of the required time of residence, which is finally the same (5 years) in Lyon and Budapest and not very different in practice from what exists in Zurich (as years between 10 and 20 years old double count).

Looking at another main way to access nationality – through marriage – the national legislations are closer to each other, being overall quite liberal. In all cities, the required time of residence (and/or marriage) for persons married with nationals is significantly reduced



compared to other categories of immigrants and does not exceed 5 years. The most liberal systems can be found in the 2 Southern-European cities, Milan and Madrid (respectively 6 months and 1 year of residence, or 3 years of marriage in Milan), London (2 years instead of 5 in the general case) and Budapest (3 years of residence instead of 8). In Lyon and Zurich, the system is less open (respectively 4 years of marriage or 5 if the person has not lived in Lyon for at least 1 year ; 5 years of residence instead of 12 and 3 years of marriage). As regards Lyon, the current situation results from very recent legislative modifications (in 2003 and 2006) introduced by a right-wing government. The changes of the system in a liberal or restrictive way have been deeply politicized in the last two decades and connected to the right-left political cleavage. In Milan, it must be noted that the provision related to marriage with a national is very favourable whereas all other elements of the nationality law are rather restrictive.



The provisions related to the first generation immigrants' naturalization significantly vary again according to cities. The configuration of cities according to the degree of openness of their legal system is overall not very different from that we identified regarding the second generation immigrants' access to nationality. A quite liberal legislation does exist in London and Lyon, where immigrants can be naturalized after 5 years of residence in the country (with some additional conditions, see economic and cultural requirements below). The French legislation is even more open as it relaxes this condition of residence for nationals from states that have historical and cultural links with Lyon<sup>2</sup>. However, this provision is rarely implemented and it is difficult to get the status after less than several years of residence in France. It must also be noted that naturalization is not institutionally encouraged in France (for example, through information work directed to immigrants) as it is conceived as an

<sup>2</sup> Nationals from former French colonies or dependent states or from countries where French is one of the official language (in the latter case on the condition the applicant has French as his/her mother tongue and has been educated in a French school abroad during at least 5 years).

individual and voluntary step achieving the integration process. Budapest Milan and especially Zurich have restrictive requirements (respectively 8, 10 and 12 years of residence, with an extra time of 2 years in Zurich for accessing also the local citizenship). However, special provisions are set up in Budapest for Ethnic Hungarians, representing the high majority of immigrants in Budapest. They can be naturalized on preferential conditions, with no requirement in terms of residence. Since 1992, a dual system exists in Milan, significantly differentiating EU residents from third-country residents (4 years and 10 years respectively). The situation of immigrants in Madrid also varies according to immigrant's origins, but in a different direction. A main characteristic of the Spanish nationality law is the preferential treatment for immigrants from former colonies. In particular, residents coming from Ibero-American states can be naturalized after only two years of residence in the country. This differentiates the case of Madrid from other cities of former colonial countries such as London and Lyon, where the special advantages granted to immigrants from ancient colonies have disappeared or at least, in the case of veLyon, has increasingly been reduced.

Cities are again different in terms of required economic conditions for naturalization. A first group of cities (London, Madrid and Milan) have no economic requirements. In Budapest, economic requirements do exist (systematically, for the access to all short-term and long-term permits), but no fixed amounts are determined. In the case of Lyon, the resources of the applicant must be "stable and sufficient", which means, in practice, that incomes lower than the legal minimum wage are usually considered to be insufficient. In Zurich, the economic requirement is less demanding, since the legislation stipulates only that the applicant must not be 'welfare-dependent' by their own fault and by their own abuse.

Lastly, if one looks at the grounds for citizenship withdrawal, provisions in London remain the most liberal ones, since only fraud and threat to national security/public policy can be taken into account. Yet, it should be emphasised that a restrictive policy has been adopted in 2005, which has met some strong criticism of the Commission for Racial Equality: a dual national British citizenship can be revoked if it is considered as not "conducive to the public good". Since the notion remains very vague, it may be applied very extensively to a broad set of circumstances, not only to specific cases involving threat to national security and public order. The Hungarian legislation is the most open as it only mentions cases of fraud and threat to national security. By contrast, the idea of national loyalty is put forward much more in the case of Spain: in this case, exclusive use of previous nationality for 3 years, enrolment in a foreign army, or in a foreign government against the will of authorities, are grounds for withdrawal. This is in Lyon that there is the most restrictive legislation: this considers not only national loyalty in relation to previous national belonging (whenever actions have been carried out in favour of a foreign state and are detrimental to France's interests) but also French nationals' duties (for example, non-respect for the obligations related to military service, actions against public administration committed by public officers). Also, criminal sentences to 5 years in prison were sufficient for losing the French nationality before 1998.

## **2. Social and economic rights**


## a. Labour market

### - Short-term permits

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
25	<b>Access to employment</b> <b>Split: For each of the three groups</b>	Legal limitations in both public and private sector  Budapest, London, Lyon (Algerians and Tunisians), Madrid, Milan, Zurich (Turks and Kosovars)	Legal limitations in the public sector only (also for activities not involving an actual participation to the exercise of public authority)  Zurich (Italians)	Equal access with nationals, excluding the activities involving an actual participation to the exercise of public authority  Lyon (Italians)
26	<b>Termination of a foreigner's work contract is a reason for revoking or refusing to renew his/her permit of stay</b> <b>Split: For each of the three groups</b> <b>Only consider workers here (not immigrant with another status: family, student, etc.)</b>	In all cases except if the foreigner has a new job/a new job offer  Budapest, London, Madrid	Not if the foreigner has lost his/her job: a new permit is then granted for ≤ 6 months	Not if the foreigner has lost his/her job: more open conditions (new permit granted for more than 6 months ; possible new extension afterwards on some conditions, etc.)  Lyon, Milan, Zurich

The access to the labour market for short-term permit holders is very restricted in the investigated cities, which all implement a principle of national preference, even if it is not referred to as such in some cities (such as in Lyon, where this reference is clearly connected to the political rhetoric of the Front National). This restriction of the labour market can take different forms. In two cities (Milan and London), the national authorities fix each year the quotas of foreigner workers allowed to work in the country. Quotas are based on the economy's needs, taking also into account local variations. In London, quotas also concern immigrants' origins, which, in practice, have significantly reduced working perspectives for some ethnic groups, such as the Bangladeshi (active in the restaurant trade). The legal limitations can be set up through a general principle stating that a position cannot be fulfilled by a foreigner if a national or EU citizen is available for it: this is the case of London, Madrid, and Budapest. As for Lyon, this language is not used in the legislation but in practice the situation is exactly the same: a work permit can be refused when considering the employment situation in the occupation considered at the local level. Moreover, there are special regulations set up by various professional sectors that limit, through requirements related to the French nationality and especially to French diplomas and professional titles, foreigners' access to the labour market. In old immigration cities such as London, Lyon and Zurich, a clear preference is given to high-skilled workers through specific rules and schemes greatly facilitating their access to the labour market. In most of the cities, there are also special regulations related to sectors and occupations undergoing skills shortages, whether they correspond to qualified jobs or not. For example, in Madrid, the national preference does not apply to this kind of jobs according to the law. In Lyon, the authorities cannot put forward the

argument of the employment situation to reject applications for work permits in such sectors and jobs.



Focusing on the public sector, the only liberal system is that of London. In this city, through a national regulation (the Race Relations Amendment Act adopted in 2000), public authorities are encouraged to promote equality and may target particular minority groups (even foreigners) if their presence in the workforce does not reflect their presence in the population. In addition, major public sector employers, such as the health service and schools, actively recruit overseas to redress local shortages. London is also an exception in that there are no rules with regard to the exercise of public authority: such a limitation would be considered as a breach of race relations legislation prohibiting any discrimination on the grounds of race and nationality. In all other cities, all types of public-sector jobs are banned for foreigners, except for EU citizens who can access those that do not involve the exercise of public authority.

The termination of a foreigner's work contract is a ground for withdrawing the short-term permit in Madrid, London and Budapest. In Lyon, Milan and Zurich, the rules are more flexible since a specific case is taken into account: the foreigner's involuntary unemployment. In this case, a new permit is granted (or the permit is renewed) for at least six months in Milan and one year in Lyon. In Zurich, it is when the unemployment period reaches one year that the permit is renewed for one year (instead of five).

#### *- Long-term permits*


N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
27	Access to employment Split: For each of the three groups	Legal limitations in both public and private sector	Legal limitations in the public sector only (also for activities not involving an actual participation to the exercise of public authority)	Equal access with nationals, excluding the activities involving an actual participation to the exercise of public authority

		Budapest, (Algerians Tunisians)	Lyon and	Madrid, Milan	London, (Italians), Zurich	Lyon
28	<b>Unemployment is a reason for revoking or refusing to renew his/her permit of stay Split: For each of the three groups</b> <b>Only consider workers here (not immigrant with another status: family, student, etc.)</b>	Yes (or except if the foreigner still has sufficient resources to live)  Budapest		Only if it results in the foreigner's welfare dependence (ie for his/her minimum income to live) <i>for a long period (<math>\geq 1</math> year)</i> Zurich	Not at all  London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan	

In most of the cities, the legal limitations that do exist for short-term permit holders in the private sector disappear as far as long-term residents are concerned: in London, Madrid, Milan and Zurich, long-term residents have the same rights as nationals regarding the access to the private labour market. In 2 cities, the access to the private sector jobs is still limited for immigrants: in Budapest, the Minister of Labour can decide through a decree all private and public positions banned for foreigners on account of the employment situation. In Lyon, the limitations described above do apply even to long-term residents.


As for the civil service, the ban existing in Budapest, Lyon, Madrid and Milan also concerns long-term residents. In Zurich, only public jobs involving the exercise of public authority are still banned for immigrants.

**Access to the labour market - all types of permits**



The security of the status is ensured, whatever the long-term residents' situation is regarding employment in most of the cities, except in Budapest where the long-term permit remains linked to work (or to the level of resources), and in Zurich where the renewal of the permit can be refused if long-term unemployment causes welfare-dependence.


## Economic rights - long-term permits



### b. Welfare state access

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
29	Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare for illegal immigrants <u>Illegal immigrants</u>	No access  Milan	-Only health assistance -or health assistance and other types of assistance but all related to dangerous and emergency situations -or legal access but low/no implementation Budapest, London, Zurich	Health assistance <i>and</i> other social rights (for example: some minimal child benefits, urgent housing...)  Lyon, Madrid
30	Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare for non-nationals a. minimum income support b. minimum housing support c. family and child benefits d. assistance in case of illness e. pregnancy and maternity care f. long-term care <u>Short-term permits</u>	Less than core benefits or no access  Budapest, London	- Limitation to core benefits: a, d, e and f - or access to all benefits but with conditions of time of residence/of legal employment for one or some of them - or legal access but limited/no implementation - or legal access but possible negative consequences for immigrants (for example: risk of expulsion or permit's withdrawal if welfare dependent) Lyon (Algerians and Tunisians), Milan, Zurich (Turks and Kosovars)	Equal access with nationals for all these benefits  Lyon (Italians), Madrid, Zurich (Italians)





### 3. Anti-discrimination rights


N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
32	Legislation against ethnic discriminations	No legislation against ethnic discriminations	Legislation against actions only	Legislation against actions and words Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
33	(if a legislation exists) Types of sanctions in case of racially discriminatory hiring	Only fines Budapest; London, Milan	Possibility of imprisonment < 2 years maximum Madrid, Zurich	Possibility of imprisonment ≥ 2 years or ≤ 2 years with loss of rights
34	Public structures dealing with ethnic discriminations	None	Structures with only a consultative/ study role Madrid, Milan, Zurich	Structures with stronger powers Budapest, London, Lyon

Anti-discrimination regulations are quite recent in most of the investigated European cities: they have often been adopted throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. London constitutes an exception, where an effective and wide-ranging anti-discrimination legislation (impacting upon employment, housing, education, etc.) has been in existence for a long time, since the Race Relations Acts on racist claims in 1965 and on discriminatory actions in 1976.. The legislation has been modified in the early 2000s so as to include indirect discrimination and take into account discrimination on all types of religious grounds (this measure was especially meant to protect the Muslim group). While it is as old as the British one, the French legislation is much less comprehensive. For example, in the field of labour relations,



the focus has traditionally been on hiring and dismissal, with no explicit acknowledgement of indirect discrimination, and, more importantly, the obligation to provide evidences for victims of discrimination themselves. Anti-discrimination provisions have then been extended. Latest developments have been set up under the European Union's influence, thus integrating the notion of indirect discrimination, including many more aspects of social life, and modifying the obligation of evidence. An effective anti-discrimination legislation has emerged in the 1990s also in Milan and Zurich, covering verbal abuses, discourses and discriminatory actions (though the notion of indirect discrimination has not been officially recognized). In Budapest, the regulations are more recent (2003). As in the case of Madrid, the legislation in Budapest is quite comprehensive, aims at direct and indirect discriminations, and includes all spheres as well as words and actions.

### Anti-discrimination rights and policies



The regime of sanctions does vary from one city to another. However, it seems that this variation reveals the specific types of law and judicial procedures existing in the cities rather than more or less favourable systems in the field of the fight against ethnic discriminations. In Milan and London, civil procedures or disciplinary sanctions can also be used in case of discriminatory hiring. In Lyon, Zurich and Madrid, such an action is merely dealt with in the criminal law and hence only sentences to prison are possible (up to 3 years in Lyon, 2 years in the two other cities), but rarely, if ever (in Zurich) implemented.

As regards the existence of specialized public structures on ethnic discriminations, London appears as a forerunner city since the Commission for Racial Equality exists since 1976 and has large powers, including investigations, taking of legal actions, and legal assistance to victims. It is soon going to be replaced by the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, whose role in the policy field will be greater. Anti-discrimination laws will thus be enforced not only on racial grounds but also on other grounds such as religion and gender, promoting equality and human rights. In Budapest and Lyon, similar public structures are very recent (2005) but they do have extended powers, such as responsibilities for processing complaints, reporting and making proposals to governments. In Madrid, the local public structures (the "Anti-Discrimination Unit") has started its activities only in 2006. Apart from the help to

victims, its power in the policy-making is relatively limited since no permanent and formal channel of cooperation with the authorities exist. In Milan, specific information about the operating of the regional structures foreseen by the 1998 law on immigration is not available. These structures have a role of monitoring, information and assistance to victims. Some specialized research institutions are also working on the issue at the local level. Lastly, as for Zurich, the Federal Commission against racism has been set up in 1995, but it has only a consultative and research role.


#### 4. Political rights

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
35	Right to vote in local elections	No right  Lyon (Algerians and Tunisians), Madrid, Milan, Zurich	Right: -with a condition of length of residence ≥ 5 years -or with a condition of length of residence and another condition	Right with a condition of length of residence < 5 years  Budapest, London, Lyon (Italians)
36	Right to stand for local elections	No right  Budapest, Lyon (Algerians and Tunisians), Madrid, Milan, Zurich	Right: -with a condition of length of residence ≥ 5 years -or with a condition of length of residence and another condition -or restricted to certain posts	Unrestricted right with a condition of length of residence < 5 years  London, Lyon (Italians)

Specific regulations do exist for EU immigrants, who can vote and stand as candidates in local elections since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 instituting a European citizenship. Only the United Kingdom grants the right to vote and to be elected to most of its non-EU immigrants at the local level. This is a result of the privileged rights which the UK has granted for a certain time to citizens from Commonwealth countries. In Budapest, the system is also relatively open, as long-term foreigner residents can vote at the local level (but they are not entitled to the passive right of eligibility). In all other cities, non-EU immigrants, even those from ex-colonies, do not have electoral rights. Yet, the issue of non-EU immigrants' political rights at the local level has been a matter of concern in all the investigated cities. The issue has been discussed in France since the 1970s, but in spite of several bills in the early 2000s, the legislation has not changed on this point, in a climate of hostility to immigrants among some sectors of public opinion. In Madrid, the recent intense national debate that took place in the summer of 2006 about immigrants' voting rights, and the claim from some Catalan nationalist parties of the need to subordinate these rights to some minimal proof of cultural integration requirements has brought about no final legislation change, partly due to the legal difficulties involved<sup>3</sup> and due to insufficient motivation from the national

<sup>3</sup> The Spanish constitution only considers the possibility of granting electoral rights to non-citizens at the local level on a reciprocity basis. Thus, this can only be implemented through bilateral agreements with the countries

government. In Zurich, the issue of immigrants' voting rights has also been debated since 1998 but with no actual implication. Yet, it should be emphasised that immigrants' voting rights are indeed acknowledged in 5 other Swiss cantons.





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of origin of the immigrants, which creates a serious potential for political inequalities among immigrants of different origins. Otherwise, a constitutional amendment would be necessary to grant voting rights generally to all non-citizens.

## II - Cultural / group- rights

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
37	Cultural requirements for obtaining short-term permits	Language requirement and other cultural conditions (such as knowledge of history/culture/ civic knowledge)	-Language requirement only -or cultural requirements only for the renewal of the permit	None  Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
38	Cultural requirements for obtaining long-term residence permits (duration of validity $\geq 5$ years)	Language requirement and other cultural conditions  London	-Language requirement only -or cultural requirements only for the renewal of the permit	None  Budapest, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
39	Cultural requirements for naturalization (first generation immigrants)	Language requirement and other cultural conditions Budapest (Chinese and Muslims), London, Lyon, Zurich	Language requirement only	None  Budapest (Ethnic Hungarians), Madrid, Milan



Focusing on cultural requirements to access permits and nationality, we can distinguish different types of situation. There are no cultural requirements, even for naturalization, in Budapest, Madrid in Milan; in the former two cities, this has especially to be related to the cultural closeness existing between the indigenous population and the largest groups of immigrants (Ethnic-Hungarians in Budapest, Latin-American in Madrid). Lyon's situation is quite peculiar. New or strengthened cultural requirements have been set up recently and are currently very strong for other immigrants (language and civic knowledge is assessed for the

renewal of the short-term permit, for the issue of the long-term one and for naturalization); yet, they do not apply, as far as permits to stay are concerned, to Italians (as EU citizens) and Algerians and Tunisians (due to the special agreements existing in both cases and that are former than these reforms). However, it must be stressed that there is some uncertainty on whether these new cultural norms are not applied to Algerians and Tunisians, since it is possible that prefectures use them in practice. In addition, Algerians and Tunisians settling in Lyon are obliged, as other immigrants, to follow civic courses and, if needed, language programs, which clearly shows a form of reverting to “assimilation”. Regarding London, new provisions have been introduced in this field: immigrants must take “life in the UK” test (in addition to language requirements) for the access to long-term permits since April 2007 and for naturalization since 2005. Hence the UK seems to shift towards a model that more greatly emphasises the need for common ground in a multiethnic society. This makes the London’s situation somewhat closer to Lyon’s, but on a limited extent only as in the latter case assimilationist goals can clearly be identified. In Zurich, cultural requirements constitute a key element of the naturalization procedure, but not to permits’ issuance: both the command of German and the historical and cultural knowledge of the applicant are assessed.

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
40	Host-country language programs for immigrant adults	None or totally private-funded programs  Budapest	-Private programs receiving public subsidies but these only represent a part of their funding -public-funded programs but limited/rare implementation Milan	Public programs  London, Lyon, Madrid, Zurich
41	Host-country language programs for immigrant children	None or totally private-funded programs	-Private programs receiving public subsidies but these only represent a part of their funding -public-funded programs but limited/rare implementation Budapest, Milan	Public programs  London, Lyon, Madrid, Zurich


In all the cities, there exist public-funded host-country language programs both for adults and children, except in Budapest where language programs only concern refugee adults. In this city, some children provisions do exist but are new and have rarely been implemented. In Milan, the development of public language programs for immigrant adults and children is still quite limited.

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
42	Possibility of public funding for Muslim private-owned schools (full time schools)	No possibility <i>and</i> existence of such a funding for other denominational schools (dominant religion in particular) <b>Milan</b>	No public funding for any kind of denominational private-owned schools  <b>Zurich</b>	Possibility of public funding  <b>Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid</b>
43	(if there is a possibility) Number of public-funded Muslim schools (full-time schools)	None  <b>London, Madrid, Zurich</b>	Rare structures ≤ 0,1 school for 1 000 Muslims in the locality <b>Budapest</b>	More developed structures
44	Possibility of public funding for other minority group private-owned schools (full time schools)	No possibility <i>and</i> existence of such a funding for other private-owned schools <b>Milan</b>	No public funding for any kind of private-owned schools  <b>Zurich</b>	Possibility of public funding  <b>Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid</b>
45	(if there is a possibility) Number of public-funded minority group schools (full-time schools)	None  <b>London, Madrid (Moroccans), Milan, Zurich</b>	Rare structures ≤ 0,1 school for 1 000 persons of the minority groups in the locality <b>Budapest (Chinese/Muslims), Madrid (Ecuadorians and Andean Mixed group)</b>	More developed structures  <b>London</b>
46	Cultural/language courses for pupils of minority groups inside public schools (courses on their original language and/or culture) Split: For each of the three groups	None or totally private-funded programs	- Only partly public-funded/supported programs (for example: subsidies not representing the total of the budget; only public buildings granted for these courses, etc.) -public-funded programs but limited/rare implementation <b>Budapest, London, Madrid, Milan, Zurich</b>	Public-funded programs with implementation  <b>Lyon</b>
47	Changes in public schools 'curriculum to take into account the cultural diversity of society	None	-Limited changes (for example, small sections in the history/ geography/citizenship education/religious education... curricula about immigration or the cultural differences existing on the national territory, etc.) -significant changes (multiculturalism)	Multiculturalism/ cultural diversity are explicitly recognized as important lines of the school curriculum

		Budapest, Madrid, Milan	Lyon, Zurich	explicitly recognized as an important line of the curriculum) but limited/rare implementation	London
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In most of the cities (Budapest, London, Lyon and Madrid), the public funding is available for Muslim private-owned schools as other minority or faith-schools. However, the implementation of such a right has not been developed up to now for different reasons, depending on the cities considered. In Budapest and Madrid, this can be (at least partly) related to the small number of Muslims living in the city. However, some minority schools do exist in Madrid: Evangelical schools (2 in the city) can attract immigrant families from the Andean group. In Budapest, there are one Chinese and one Arabic private schools that receive public funds. In London, such a provision is new (since 1998) and it is probable that Muslim schools will develop in the future, as they have done in other British local areas where there is a high proportion of Muslim families. In Lyon, the regulations applying to Muslim schools are the general ones ruling all private-owned schools' public subsidies, but the development of Muslim schools is recent and sometimes must confront a local climate of hostility among local officials and local public opinion. In Milan, the system clearly gives a privilege to the majority religion as only Catholic schools can be publicly funded. Regarding home culture/language courses, the only city implementing in a developed way such programs is Lyon. However, it must be noted that the existing structures were created in the 1970's, in a context where it was thought that many immigrants would return to their country of origin; hence such structures do not necessarily bear witness for the political will to support minority cultural identities. In the 5 other cities, such courses are available but they are only partly public-funded (Madrid) or implemented only rarely (Budapest) or with variation according to the local area (London). In most of the cases, the promotion of cultural diversity through official school curricula is inexistent. In this respect, London constitutes a noticeable exception, the emphasis of diversity being one of the main general orientations of the school system. In Zurich, there is only a limited project: a new subject that will introduce pupils to different religions through a cultural approach, Islam included, will be set up in schools from 2007-2008.


### Schooling



N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
48	Religious education in public schools	Religious education classes where the majority religion is predominantly or exclusively evoked  Milan	-No religious education in public schools -Islamic classes possible but limited/rare implementation Lyon, London (varies according to local practice), Madrid, Zurich	Religion-specific classes including Islamic ones (families choose to have them or not)  Budapest
49	Islamic religious signs in the public sector	Not allowed  Lyon	-allowed under some conditions -or no public regulation and not well tolerated in practice Milan	- allowed without conditions - or no legislation and tolerated in practice  Budapest, London, Madrid, Zurich
50	Islamic religious signs in the private sector	Not allowed	-allowed under some conditions -or no public regulation and not well tolerated in practice Lyon, Zurich	- allowed without conditions -or no legislation and tolerated in practice  Budapest, London, Madrid, Milan
51	Islamic breaks for praying	Not allowed	-allowed under some conditions -or no public regulation and not well tolerated in practice Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich	- allowed without conditions - or no legislation and tolerated in practice  Budapest, London
52	Cemeteries and burial according to Islamic rite	Not allowed	-allowed under some conditions	- allowed without conditions



			-or no public regulation and not well tolerated in practice London, Lyon, Milan	- or no legislation and tolerated in practice Budapest, Madrid, Zurich
53	Local public budget for mosques (building and managing)	No possibility of public funding and existence of such a funding for buildings of other religions Lyon, Madrid, Milan	No public funding for any kind of religious buildings Budapest, Zurich	Possibility of public funding. London



The toleration of Muslims' religious expressions is overall limited, except in London and Budapest. In both cities, they are largely allowed. In Budapest, this results from the national legislative rules adopted in the early 1990s in the field of education and religion and guaranteeing a quite high level of liberty in this field. These provisions were not meant to Islam when adopted but Muslim groups can benefit from them today. In practice, such religious expressions seem to be tolerated, bearing also in mind that the number of Muslims is low in Budapest. Mosques, as all other religious institutions cannot be funded by the public authorities. In London, there is no legal frame regulating the wearing of the headscarf in the public and private sectors but they are generally accepted without difficulties. Regarding Islamic breaks for praying, recent national public regulations have strengthened the rights of Muslim workers in this field. The separation between the public sphere and religions does not exist in London as in other cities since public funding is available for mosques (as for other religious institutions). Islamic religious classes can be organized in schools with a majority of Muslim pupils.

In Madrid and Zurich, there is no religious education in public schools. Generally speaking, no public regulation has been adopted regarding Islamic religious signs and these are variably

tolerated, depending on the sector and on the cases. In Madrid, the wearing of the headscarf in the public or private sectors have not been a discussed issue and does not seem to raise a lot of conflicts. In Zurich, the issue has been discussed regarding the public sector but Islamic religious signs are accepted. In the private sectors, the wearing of the headscarf and Islamic breaks for praying are left as a matter of negotiation between employers and employees in Zurich. In Madrid, despite a national agreement signed with the Muslim community representatives in 1992, Islamic breaks for praying are only rarely implemented in practice.

In Milan, there is no legal framework regulating Islamic religious practices. There is neither any specific provisions for religious expression in the public sector, nor is there any provision in the private sector concerning Islamic breaks for praying. While the wearing of the headscarf is usually tolerated in the private sector, a clear advantage is given to the majority religion as only Catholicism can be taught at school. Catholic Churches also receive public funds for their religious buildings.

In Lyon, Islamic religious classes in public schools are totally banned in the framework of the French secular system. The wearing of the headscarf is rejected in the public sector (according to the recent jurisprudence of the Council of the State) and variably dealt with but overall not well tolerated in the private sector. Regarding Islamic breaks for praying, there is no public regulation; they do not correspond to a core demand from Muslim communities and are generally not implemented apart from some industrial companies with high proportion of Muslims and essentially during the Ramadan.

As for the existence of cemeteries and burials according to the Islamic, as they constitute a significant symbolic issue, they are accepted in all of the cities, except the burial into earth without coffin in London, Lyon and Milan, for reasons related to hygiene.

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
54	Islamic religious programs in public and state-subsidized private broadcasting (not including cable and satellite)	None  Budapest, London, Milan, Zurich	<1 hour a week  Lyon, Madrid	≥ 1 hour a week
55	Programs in public and state-subsidized private broadcasting (not including cable and satellite) for other minority groups or for the whole immigrant population Split: For each of the three groups	None  Budapest, Lyon, London (African Caribbean), Milan, Zurich	<1 hour a week  Madrid (Moroccans)	≥ 1 hour a week  London (Bangladeshi and Indian), Madrid (Ecuadorians and Andean Mixed group)


The promotion of immigrants' integration and of cultural diversity through media is scarcely developed in all the cities. The only exceptions are London and Madrid. In London, only the Bangladeshi and Indian groups are concerned since the weekly programs on public-subsidized TV address South-Asian communities. In Madrid, there are both programs for the whole immigrant population and programs dedicated to Latin-American immigrants. In Lyon and Madrid, there are some religious programs on Sunday morning, addressing the main

religious groups in society (Jews, Catholics, Protestant, etc.), with, however, a clear advantage granted to the Catholic majority. In Lyon, the debate regarding TV is rather focused on the presence of people from diverse ethnic backgrounds among TV staff, persons in the public and the better coverage of immigration issues than the design of programs addressing specifically a part of the population. In Budapest, Milan and Zurich, there are no programs at all, but there is currently a debate over the issue in Zurich, following a project by a MP on a program for Albanians (who are mainly Kosovars in Zurich).

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
56	Affirmative actions for ethnic minorities in the private sector	None  Budapest, Madrid, Milan, Zurich	-In some companies only: no public regulation/incitation about this -or public incitation/regulation but not targeted specifically to immigrants/ethnic minorities but to all disadvantaged people Lyon	Public regulation/incitation (reporting on workforce composition, incitation to implement quotas, financial incentives for the employment of people of ethnic minorities, etc.) London
57	Affirmative actions for ethnic minorities in the public sector	None  Budapest, Madrid, Zurich	Report, studies on the workforce composition only Lyon, Milan	Stronger measures (quotas regulation, targets to be achieved, etc.) London
58	Measures to further the integration of foreigners into the labour market a. Policy targets to reduce unemployment of foreigners b. Policy targets to promote vocational training for foreigners	No elements  Budapest, Milan	-Any of these elements ( <i>or</i> other) but not all -or limited/rare/to be done implementation -or targeted to some categories of immigrants only Lyon, Madrid	All elements  London, Zurich

As for immigrants/minority groups' rights in the labour market sphere, the situation shows a high restrictiveness in most of the cities, except, again, London. In this latter city, the national regulations do not allow forms of positive discriminations (through quotas, for example), but targeted employment policies to improve the presence and promotion of ethnic minority groups in the private and especially public sectors are implemented. In Lyon, such orientations are unconceivable given the reluctance, in the political sphere and in the public opinion, towards any separate and preferential system directed to a specific identity group (the only exception is the "parity", i.e. the equality system between men and women in political elections only). Promotion of affirmative actions would also be difficult due to the lack of ethnic statistics. Nevertheless, ethnic minorities are very often the actual beneficiaries (if not unofficial targets) of policies directed to disadvantaged people or areas, which are officially defined along socio-economic criteria. In all other cities, affirmative actions directed to some specific ethnic groups are not implemented. However, programs that aim at favouring the foreigners' integration in the labour market have been set up in Zurich and, will

be implemented in Madrid in the future. In Zurich, the local plan for integration includes actions in favour of young unemployed immigrants (with a particular attention paid to the transition from school to the labour market and to young women) and promotion of immigrants' independent work. In Madrid, the municipal plan for social and multicultural coexistence comprises an action called "Firms park for Labour integration", with a focus on cultural diversity and immigrants' integration into private companies. In addition, the regional government of Madrid has announced programs for immigrants' vocational training and creation of firms. All these actions in Madrid have been decided in the past year and are still to be implemented.



### III - General political opportunity structures

#### 1. Configuration of powers

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
59	<b>Degree of federalism and decentralization</b> (Scoring based on Lijphart's indicators and values)	France (1.3), Hungary (1.0 =not attributed by Lijphart, but based on his criteria), UK (1.0), Italy (1.3)	Spain (3.0)	Switzerland (5.0)
60	<b>Decentralization at the local level: sub-local public structures (at the level of district, neighbourhood) with political powers</b>	None Zurich	Limited powers: low budget, only a role of implementation and no role in the definition of local policies, which is centralized Lyon (9 districts), Madrid (21 districts),	Greater powers: specifically in charge of some sectors of public policies (definition and implementation), involvement in the definition of the whole

			Milan (9 area councils)	city 's local policies Budapest (23 districts), London (32 boroughs)
61	Power distribution in the city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The executive (e.g. mayor and deputy mayors) is dominant is the decision-making: Lyon city and all others cities of the Lyon's urban areas, Madrid</li> <li>- Balance of powers between the executive and the legislative (e.g. local council): London, Milan, Zurich</li> <li>- The legislative is dominant: Budapest (in districts and in the Metropolitan Budapest)</li> </ul>		
62	Electoral systems – Local level	Only majoritarian London boroughs (North London)	Predominantly majoritarian with a degree of proportionality Budapest districts, Lyon city and all others cities of the Lyon's urban areas, Milan	Proportional representation London city, Zurich, Budapest Assembly, Madrid
63	Party systems in the city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Two-party system:</li> <li>- Multiparty system: Budapest, London, Lyon city and all others cities of the Lyon's urban areas (except Oullins since 1995, Décines-Charpieu and Pierre-Bénite since 2001), Milan, Zurich</li> <li>- Intermediary situation: Madrid (the electoral system does not reduce proportionality, but de facto close currently to a two-party system, the United Left being very weak)</li> </ul>		
64	Party(ies) in power in the city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- one party: Lyon city and all others cities of the Lyon's urban areas (one party <i>predominates</i>, even it grants some posts to other parties in its political camp), Madrid (Center-right)</li> <li>- a coalition of parties: Metropolitan Budapest (Socialist-Liberal coalition), Budapest (the Socialist party predominates in 9 districts, the Christian Democrat party in 8 districts), London city and North London boroughs (but Labour predominates in Haringey and Hackney), Milan, Zurich</li> </ul>		
65	Party (ies) in power – National Level, over the 10 past years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Right</li> <li>- Centre</li> <li>- Left: UK (Labour government, 1997-2007)</li> <li>- Coalition Right-Left: Switzerland (the “Magic Formula”)</li> <li>- Political change-over: France (Left-wing government 1997-2002; right-wing governments since 2002, under the presidency of right-wing Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy since 2007)</li> <li>Hungary (Right 1998-2002 and since 2002 Left/Liberal coalition)</li> <li>Italy (Center-Left 1996-2001, Center-Right 2001-2006, Center-Left since 2006)</li> <li>Spain (Center-right 1996-2004, Left since 2004)</li> </ul>		
66	Party (ies) in power – Local Level, over the 10 past years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Right: Some cities of the Lyon's urban area: Caluire-et-Cuire, Sainte-Foy-Lès-Lyon</li> <li>Madrid (Center-right – “Partido Popular” – with absolute majorities)</li> <li>Milan (Center-right coalitions, Mayors from “Forza Italia”)</li> <li>- Centre</li> <li>- Left: Hackney and Haringey in London (Labour)</li> <li>Some cities of the Lyon's urban area: Bron, Décines-Charpieu, Pierre-Bénite, Vaulx-en-Velin (Communist and since 2001 left-wing coalition), Vénissieux (Communist), Villeurbanne (Socialist)</li> <li>- Coalition Left-Right and/or Center: Metropolitan Budapest (Socialist-Liberal coalitions), Budapest Districts (but the Socialists have predominated in almost half of the districts, the same for a Socialist-Liberal coalition in 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, and for a coalition including the Christian Democrats in 1998-2002), London (no overall control since 2000:</li> </ul>		


		mainly Conservative and Labour, but also Green and Liberal Democrat), Zurich (Socialist, Radical (=center-right), Green, Christian Democrat or Independent (=center)) - Political change-over: Camden in London (Labour 1998-2006, then Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition formed), Islington (Labour, 1998-2002, Liberal Democrat 2002-2006, no overall control since 2006) Lyon city (Right 1995-2001, Left since 2001), Oullins (Right 1995-2001, Left since 2001), Meyzieu (Left 1995-2001, Right since 2001)
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Several hypotheses serve as bases for building the list of indicators and related scores with regard to the configuration of powers. First, we assume that the degree of federalism and decentralization (as defined by Lijphart) at the national level as well as the decentralization at the sub-local level can be positive factors impacting upon immigrants' local political participation. Potential large responsibilities granted to local authorities can constitute an opportunity for immigrants to participate and influence policies locally. The degree of proportionality in the local electoral system can also play a significant role, with immigrants' groups presumably having better political leverage in a proportional system. We had no further hypotheses regarding the other indicators as there seems to be a greater uncertainty in the way these parameters influence immigrants' political participation. However, in relation to what has been said regarding proportional electoral systems, it is likely that cities where a coalition of parties is in power (and multiple parties compete during the elections) represent a more open configuration. With regard to the political colour of the national and local powers, the related indicators remain only 'descriptive', since we have no further information on their relation with the adoption of national and local policies favourable/ unfavourable to immigrants. It is probable that this relation change continuously according to different policy areas and country/city considered. In France, for example, immigrants' integration issues are clearly politicized and very often connected to the right-left cleavage. More liberal and open policies have generally been implemented under left-wing governments, both at the national and at the sub-national level, regarding issues such as the access to the community (long-term permits and nationality), immigrants' social rights, and cultural requirements imposed to immigrants. However, a broad left-wing consensus has often existed for other issues, such as the limitation of immigrants' entrances and anti-discrimination policies,. The same goes for the distribution of powers between the legislative and the executive, since it is quite problematic to assess the nature of its impact upon immigrants' political participation. Put simply, it is still difficult to formulate a precise evaluation for all cities through a synthetic scoring for these political indicators.

Looking more specifically at the degree of federalism and decentralization, this is very low in most countries at the national level, that is, in France, Hungary, Italy and the UK. Spain is situated in an intermediary situation and can be considered as a very decentralized and quasi-federal state. Switzerland is situated on the other pole, being classified by Lijphart as among the most decentralized and federal countries. Yet, at the local level, the configuration is quite different. While there are no sub-local structures with real powers in Zurich (districts are only territorial subdivisions), those that exist in Lyon (9 districts), Madrid (21) and Milan (9) have some powers in terms of budget management and implementation of basic services. In Lyon city and Milan, for example, they can make proposals related to some issues (notably urban

planning) to the city council. In all three cities, these sub-local institutions also aim at promoting citizens' participation through formal bodies (such as citizens boards) or the management of citizens' petitions and proposals. Lastly, sub-local structures in Budapest and London have significant larger powers. The configuration of powers at the local level is based on a distribution of responsibilities between city institutions and district structures, which carry out their own policies full autonomy in some specific areas. In Budapest, district councils are specifically in charge of significant services (health, education), directed to a smaller number of citizens. In London, borough councils are responsible for a significant number of services and also implement policies defined at the national level.

#### General POS: configuration of powers at the national and local levels



Focusing on the local electoral system, a somewhat high degree of proportional representation exists in all cities. There are differences between the district and the city levels of London and Budapest. In London, the borough councils are elected through a majoritarian system whereas the London Assembly's election is only based on a pure proportional rule. District councils in Budapest are elected according to a mixed method but for the Assembly of the Metropolitan Budapest, a strict proportional electoral system is implemented. Madrid and Zurich are the cities in which the proportional rule is stronger. Lyon's and Milan's electoral system are very similar, based on a predominant majoritarian logic with a slight dose of proportionality.

As regards the executive-legislative distribution of powers, there is a great variation between cities. A first group of city includes Lyon and Madrid and is characterized by a predominance of the executive. In London, Milan and Zurich, the configuration is balanced, while the legislative is quite dominant in Budapest. At the national level, the left and center-left are predominant in most of the considered countries: Italy, Hungary, Spain and the UK. In Switzerland, a larger coalition, going from the left to the right, is governing, whereas right-wing governments are in power in France since 2002. In all cities, there is a multi-party system, except in Madrid where in practice it is currently close to a two-party system. Only one party is in power or predominates in Madrid and the cities of Lyon urban area, whereas in



all other cities coalitions of parties govern. The center-right is in power in Madrid and Milan. In the Lyon urban areas, the local political situation is diverse: the right is in power in only 3 cities (Caluire-et-Cuire, Sainte-Foy-Lès-Lyon and Meyzieu) whereas different left-wing coalitions are in power in the other cities. The left is in power in 2 London boroughs (Hackney and Haringey). Elsewhere (Budapest, Zurich, other London boroughs and city council), a coalition of parties is running.

Summing up this first set of indicators on configuration of powers, the situation is more closed in Lyon and Milan due to both the limited decentralization (at the national and local levels) and the low level of proportionality of the electoral system. In Madrid and Zurich, electoral systems are purely proportional but the decentralization, strong at the national level, is limited or inexistent in the city. As for London and Budapest, their situation is intermediary as they combine a mixed electoral system, differentiating the districts and the whole city, with a high decentralization at the local level (and an high centralization at the national level).

## 2. Participation mechanisms

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
67	Referenda (Local level)	No possibility of referendum  London	Only consultative referenda  Madrid, Milan	Binding (the measure cannot be adopted or must be abrogated)  Budapest, Lyon, Zurich
68	Who can initiate the referendum? (Local level)	No possibility of referendum  London	Only the local council/the mayor  Lyon, Madrid	Also a percentage of the citizens ("Popular initiative" referendum)  Budapest, Milan, Zurich
69	Number of (consultative or binding) referenda held over the past 10 years (Local level)	<5  London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan	≥ 5<10  Budapest	≥ 10  Zurich
70	Existence and type of citizen assemblies (Local level)	None          London (Hackney and Haringey), Caluire-et-	-Not institutionalized, occasional citizen assemblies - Not transparent representation of citizens (representation through associations only; strong presence of local officials, political parties within such bodies, etc.) -Not really working (very occasional meetings, very limited participation of citizens within them, etc.)  Budapest, London (Camden and	Institutionalized citizen assemblies (with regular meetings, etc.)          Lyon city +Villeurbanne, Vaulx-



		Cuire (Lyon urban area), Zurich	Islington), Madrid, Milan	en-Velin, Meyzieu, Pierre-Bénite
71	<b>Powers of citizen assemblies (Local level)</b>	None  Caluire-et-Cuire (Lyon urban area), Zurich	Only consultative  Budapest, London (Camden and Islington), Lyon city +Villeurbanne, Vaulx-en-Velin, Meyzieu, Pierre-Bénite, Madrid, Milan	Stronger power in the decision-making
72	<b>Involvement of civil society organizations (associations, foundations interest groups...) in the <u>definition</u> of local policies</b>	None	Informal and optional consultation  Budapest, London, Cities of Lyon urban area, Madrid, Zurich	Formal, regulated consultation  Milan, Greater Lyon
73	<b>Involvement of civil society organizations (associations, foundations interest groups...) in the <u>implementation</u> of local policies</b>	None	In partnership with public institutions  Budapest, London, Madrid, Milan, Lyon, Zurich	Full delegation of powers for the implementation of policies
74	<b>Pluralism of the participation / intermediation of interests system in the city</b>	-Only one major organization of the civil society is consulted -or no defined participation /intermediation of interests system in the city Budapest, Madrid	Coordinated and corporatist system (which gives preference to “traditional” organisations such as trade unions and employers’ organisations) London	Pluralist system (various interest and issue groups taken into account in the decision-making process)  Milan, Zurich
75	<b>Is there a specific department in the local council devoted to promote citizen participation?</b>	No department and no specific policy	No department, but there is a policy integrated within various departments London (Hackney and Haringey), cities of Lyon urban areas, Milan, Zurich	There is a specific department devoted to promote citizen participation policies Budapest, London (Camden and Islington), Greater Lyon, Madrid
76	<b>Is there a bill of rights or a similar local legislation that regulates how citizens can influence the decision-making processes in ways other than selecting their elected representatives?</b>	None  London	Yes, there exists a regulation but it is very restrictive in terms of the rights of participation granted to citizens  Cities of Lyon urban areas	Yes, there exists a regulation and it provides various mechanisms to participate during decision-making processes (hearings, appeals, consultation bodies, etc.) Budapest, Greater Lyon, , Madrid, Milan, Zurich
79	<b>If there are sub-local public structures: do citizens have participation</b>	No sub-local public structures or citizens do not elect the	There are sub-local public structures but citizens have limited	Yes, citizens (or associations) have substantial

	<b>mechanisms within these structures?</b>	officials at these bodies (they are appointed by the city council)	influence (mostly reduced to their vote to select the representatives at these bodies)	participation mechanisms in these sub-local structures (e.g. consultation, participation in meetings, etc.)
		Caluire-et-Cuire (Lyon urban area), Zurich	London (Hackney and Haringey)	Budapest, London (Camden and Islington), Lyon city +Villeurbanne, Vaulx-en-Velin, Meyzieu, Pierre-Bénite, Milan, Madrid

The political opportunity structure related to participation mechanisms vary according to cities but also to issue fields.

Focusing on rules and practice of referendum, the case of Zurich must be considered apart as it is the only one to put the use of referendum at the core of the local democracy system. Not only referenda are binding and possibly initiated by citizens, but they are often used. The Budapest's situation is favourable too, but in a much more limited extent compared to Zurich: referenda are binding and can be launched by citizens, though they are not a frequent event (only 6 over the last 10 years, compared to 86 in Zurich). The case of London is also specific as the only possibility of local referenda concerns constitutional matters and is hence an exceptional event. The situations are similar in Lyon, Madrid and, to a lesser extent, Milan. In Madrid and Milan, only consultative referenda do exist. In practice, the situation of Lyon is not so different as "decisional referenda" have been instituted only recently (2003) and have not been used so far. In addition, in Lyon and Madrid the initiative of referendum only belongs to the local powers, except that since 2005 a part of citizens can ask for a local referendum on urban planning issues (with no obligation for the local power to respond to this initiative). In Milan however, referenda can be initiated by citizens.

As far as citizens' assemblies are concerned, there is a cross-national variation but also variations amongst different cities and their districts in a same city. In London, two boroughs only (Camden and Islington) have recently set up citizens' panels; these represent little institutionalized forms of participation as they are consulted occasionally. In the Lyon urban area, the variation is related to both national provisions – obligation to create citizen assemblies in cities above 80 000 inhabitants, Lyon city and Villeurbanne are then concerned – and local decisions. Smaller cities such as Vaulx-en-Velin, Meyzieu and Pierre-Bénite have instituted forms of institutionalized citizen assemblies (contrary to cities such as Caluire-et-Cuire). Where they exist in the Lyon urban area, citizen assemblies have only a consultative role. In Milan and Budapest, citizens' consultation processes are occasional (public audiences requested by at least 1 000 citizens in Milan, one public hearing per year and occasional public meetings for specific policy issues in Budapest). In Milan, there are also citizen consultation boards on specific issues but only one operates in Milan and they only gather representatives of organizations (and not individual citizens as such). In Madrid, recent consultative bodies were set up in 2004 and 2006. It is interesting to note that foreigners can participate in these bodies. Territorial district councils deal with issues related to democratic participation at the local level, while Sectorial District Boards work on specific issues. In

addition, there are some very new bodies (the District Boards and the Madrid Forum) which have been set up in 2006 so as to tackle issues related to coexistence and diversity. However, all these bodies have not fully developed their missions, and mechanisms for participation are not very clear as they predominantly involve representatives of associations and of political parties. In Zurich, the citizens' participation is predominantly based on referenda; no form of citizen assemblies, even informal, exists.


As regards the involvement of civil society organizations in local policies, the situations of different cities are quite similar. The consultation of these organizations is most of the time optional and informal. The only exception is Milan, where the institutionalized consultation of civil society organizations concerns a significant policy field: a consultative body has been set up for social policies and includes associations. Some citizens' consultation boards can also be set up on specific issues: the only one operating in Milan concerns handicap. The other exception is the Lyon urban community (the Greater Lyon), which has developed policies aiming at promoting citizens' and civil society organizations participation. As for the implementation of local policies, civil organizations are involved in all the cities, in particular in social policies, working in partnership with public institutions. The participation/intermediation of interests system is pluralist in Milan and Zurich, co-ordinated in London and quite closed (restricted to one or two major organizations) in Budapest. In Lyon and Madrid, it is not really defined, except in some policy sectors.

Although there are citizens' participation policies in all the cities, specific departments to manage them exist only in Budapest, Madrid, two London boroughs (Camden and Islington) and the Greater Lyon. Elsewhere, such policies are integrated within various departments and services. The formalization of citizens' right to participate exists in most of the cities: Budapest, Madrid, Milan, Zurich and the Greater Lyon. In Budapest, they however are essentially the result of the national legislation in this field (public hearings and local referenda, although required thresholds are defined locally), as in the cities of Lyon urban area (compulsory citizen assemblies in big cities and local referenda). In Milan, the regulations are both national and local. In Madrid, local legislation exists in this field, as well as in Zurich (local and cantonal levels). London is the only city where there are no specific regulations about this.

Most of the citizens' participation mechanisms described above are implemented at the sub-local level (or, in Budapest at the local and at the sub-local levels), except in Zurich where districts are only territorial subdivisions, and hence, do not have any responsibility with regard to citizens' participation. In almost all of the other cities (except smaller ones in the Lyon urban area, and Hackney and Haringey in London), citizens' participation mechanisms concern the district level (apart from referenda)

The following graph has been built by mixing the 5 main different dimensions of the citizens' participation: referendum, citizens assemblies, relationships with civil society organizations, institutionalization of citizens' right to participation (through a local regulation and/or a specific local council department), and citizens' participation at the sub-local level. A unique score has been attributed for each of these dimensions and then an overall score has been calculated for each city.

### General POS: participation mechanisms



Overall, we can distinguish four different groups of cities/districts:

- 1) The first group (Haringey and Hackney in London, Caluire-et-Cuire and some other cities of the Lyon urban areas) combines exceptional or restricted procedures of referenda with little institutionalized or very occasional citizens' and civil organization consultation (and no specific rights at the sub-local level given the size of the cities considered in the Lyon urban area).
- 2) The second group (Camden and Islington in London, Zurich) is more heterogeneous. In Zurich there are very developed participation mechanisms in terms of referenda and popular initiatives, but not other channels of citizens' participation nor civil society organization's consultation (which is pluralist but generally informal). In addition, the participation mechanisms do not concern the sub-local level. In the two London boroughs, there are no referendum procedures and the involvement of citizens and civil organizations in local politics, although a matter concerns for local authorities, are not formal and regular.
- 3) The third group gathers Madrid and some cities of the Lyon urban area (Lyon city, Villeurbanne, Vaulx-en-Velin, Meyzieu, Pierre-Bénite). The referendum procedures here are quite limited both in their forms (only consultative, initiated by local powers) and their actual use. Civil society organizations can be involved in the definition of local policies, but the developments in this field are not formalized (Lyon) or still little developed (Madrid). The situation is more ambiguous in terms of other participation mechanisms: citizen assemblies are institutionalized in the big cities of Lyon urban areas and others that have decided to do so, whereas they are not well defined for the moment in the case of Madrid. Citizens' rights to participation are not dealt with through a specific local department. They are locally regulated only in the case of Madrid.
- 4) The fourth group gathers Milan and Budapest and also the Lyon urban community (Greater Lyon). In Milan and Budapest, the referenda procedures are more open (especially in Budapest). There are also forms of citizen meetings but not

institutionalized citizen assemblies. Citizens' rights to participation are defined through national and/or local regulations and implemented at the sub-local level as well. However, the situation of the two cities differs regarding the implication of civil society organizations: the system is pluralist in both cases but institutionalized only in the case of Milan (for social policies). The specificity of the Greater Lyon (compared to the cities of the area) is that it has further formalized its democratic participation policies through the institution of a specialized department dedicated to them and the elaboration of a Charter on the issue.

#### **IV - Immigrants-specific opportunity structure**

N°	Indicator	Scale		
		-1	0	1
80	Main responsibility for immigrants ' integration policies	National government  Lyon	Balance of powers between national and local governments -London, Madrid, Milan -Budapest=balance of powers in general for policies, but there is no immigrants' integration policies	Local government  Zurich
81	Public information and support services for immigrants at the local level (which inform them about their rights, the institutions to which they can address, etc.)	None  Budapest, others cities of Lyon urban area	Little developed  Lyon city + Villeurbanne	More developed (well-organized services, with, for example, interpreters, large opening hours, personal advice, following etc.) London, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
82	Which institution (s) has(ve) the leading role in the field of immigrants ' integration? – Local Level	Local councillors: London (borough councils + London Assembly together with the Mayor) The mayor: London (with the London Assembly and borough councils) A specific deputy mayor: Lyon (together with related deputy-mayors) A deputy mayor with other tasks as well: Lyon (especially the one in charge of social exclusion policies) A specialized service: Madrid ("General Directorate of Immigration, Cooperation to Development and Social Volunteering"), Zurich (the "Promotion of Integration Office") A not specialized service: Milan ("Health and Social services Division") Budapest: no immigrants' integration policies (only administrative aspects dealt with by district notary offices)		
83	Policies related to immigrants ' integration at the local level	None  Budapest, other cities of the Lyon urban area	Only studies, collection of data and/or policy papers about immigrants ' integration	Actual implementation of policies (with specific budgets)  Lyon city + Villeurbanne, London, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
84	Is there a specific	No department and no	No department, but	There is a specific

	department in the local council devoted to immigrants ' integration policies?	specific policy  Budapest, other cities of the Lyon urban area	there is a policy integrated within various departments Lyon city + Villeurbanne, London, Milan	department devoted to immigrants integration policies Madrid, Zurich
85	Percentage of total budget devoted to immigrants' integration policies	Madrid: 0,27% Milan: 1,96 % Other cities: N.A.		
86	Council/board/ assembly that represents immigrants/minority groups (for example, in France, the Parisian Council of Non-Eu foreigners)	None  Budapest, London, Other cities of the Lyon urban area, Milan	-Informal and optional consultation -not (really) working institution  Madrid	Formal, regulated consultation  Lyon city, Zurich
87	Involvement of minority/immigrant organizations in the <u>definition</u> of local policies	None  Budapest, Lyon, Madrid, Milan	Informal and optional consultation  Zurich	Formal, regulated consultation  London
88	Involvement of minority/immigrant organizations in the <u>implementation</u> of local policies	None  Budapest, Lyon, Milan	In partnership with public institutions  London, Madrid, Zurich	Full delegation of powers for the implementation of policies
89	Involvement of organizations specialized in immigration/integration issues in the <u>definition</u> of local policies	None  Budapest, other cities of the Lyon urban area, Madrid, Milan	Informal and optional consultation  Zurich	Formal, regulated consultation  London, Lyon city + Villeurbanne
90	Involvement of organizations specialized in immigration/integration issues in the <u>implementation</u> of local policies	None  Budapest, Lyon, Milan	In partnership with public institutions  London, Madrid, Milan, Zurich	Full delegation of powers for the implementation of policies
91	Involvement of organizations playing a relevant role for immigrants ' integration (such as Human rights organizations) in the <u>definition</u> of local policies	None  Budapest, Lyon, Madrid, Milan	Informal and optional consultation  Zurich	Formal, regulated consultation  London
92	Involvement of organizations playing a relevant role for immigrants ' integration (such as Human rights organizations) in the	None	In partnership with public institutions	Full delegation of powers for the implementation of policies

	<b>implementation of local policies.</b>	Budapest, Lyon	London, Madrid, Milan, Zurich	
93	<b>Involvement of the local power in the funding of minority/immigrants organizations</b>	No public funding available for these organizations  Lyon	On the same basis of as “autochthonous” or “non-ethnic” organizations  Budapest, Milan, Zurich	-Separate funding schemes addressed to “immigrant” or “ethnic-based” organizations -or clear specific policy to favour the funding of these organizations (for example: a certain amount is reserved to these organizations or some “points” are given to their applications) London, Madrid
94	<b>Requirements to be able to apply for subsidies</b>	Strong requirement concerning the language that should be used	Only requirements concerning the type of activities implemented	No requirement other than those for “autochthons”  Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Zurich
95	<b>Party arrangements to favour the presence of persons with ethnic minority background in the leadership of the party – Local level</b> Milan: N.A.	None  Budapest, Lyon, Madrid	Informal attempts to encourage their presence	Formal attempts (quotas regulation, targets to be achieved, special lists presented, etc.) London, Zurich
96	<b>Party arrangements to favour the presence of persons with ethnic minority background in the party (rank-and-file members)– Local level</b> Milan: N.A.	None  Budapest, Lyon, Madrid	Informal attempts to encourage their presence	Formal attempts (quotas regulation, targets to be achieved, special lists presented, etc.) London, Zurich
97	<b>Share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote – National level: general elections</b> <u>Mean over the 10 past years (raw percentage)</u>	> 10  Lyon, Zurich	> 5 ≤ 10 %  Milan	≤ 5 %  Budapest, London, Madrid
98	<b>Share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote – Local level: general elections</b> <u>Mean over the 10 past years (raw percentage)</u>	> 10  All cities of the Lyon urban areas, Zurich	> 5 ≤ 10 %  Budapest, Milan	≤ 5 %  London, Madrid
99	<b>Share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote – Local elections (city council)</b>	> 10  All other cities of the Lyon urban area,	> 5 ≤ 10 %  Budapest, a few cities of the Lyon urban area	≤ 5 %  London, Madrid



	<u>Mean over the 10 past years (raw percentage)</u>	Zurich	(Oullins, Pierre-Bénite, Sainte-Foy-Lès-Lyon and some districts of Lyon city: 1 <sup>st</sup> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> , 4 <sup>th</sup> , 5 <sup>th</sup> , 6 <sup>th</sup> and 7 <sup>th</sup> ), Milan	
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Analytically, when focusing on the immigrants-specific opportunity structure, we propose to regroup our set of indicators under 5 main headings:

- The “degree of development of immigrants’ integration policy at the local level” includes the following indicators: role of local power in this field compared to the national one (indicator n°80), local public information and support services for immigrants (81), existence of actual immigrants’ integration local policies (83), existence of a specific department devoted to immigrants’ integration at the local level (84).<sup>4</sup>
- The “political representation of immigrants” includes indicators on specific councils/boards (86) and political parties’ arrangements (95 and 96<sup>5</sup>).
- The “attitude of local powers towards minority/immigrants organizations” includes involvement of these organizations in the definition (87) and in the implementation (88) of local policies, involvement of the local power in the funding of these organizations (93), as well as requirements for these organizations to apply for public subsidies (94).
- The “attitude of local powers towards organizations whose activity is specialized in/has an impact on immigration/integration issues” includes involvement of these organizations in the definition (89 and 91) and in the implementation (90, 92) of local policies;
- The “political audience of anti-immigrant and radical right parties”, lastly, includes the indicators assessing the weight of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote (indicators 97, 98 and 99).

In most of the cases, national and local powers share responsibilities for immigrants’ integration policies. In the UK, national institutions and policy elites (for example, relevant Ministries, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion and the Commission for Racial Equality) are key actors in the definition of the main lines in this field, but local authorities exercise considerable powers regarding education, planning law, places of worship and information to immigrants. The situation is quite similar in Milan and Madrid: in these two cases, general objectives are determined at the national level (mainly regarding border controls and admissions for Madrid), but municipalities (and also regional governments in the case of Madrid) elaborate policies in a range of fields (for example, education, social services, healthcare, etc.). In Budapest, there is in principle a balance of powers between the national and local powers; yet, there have not been definite immigrants’ integration policies until the present day. The high level of decentralization of Switzerland is reflected in immigrants’

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<sup>4</sup> Information about the percentage of total local budget devoted to immigrants’ integration policies has not been taken into account since data were available in only two cities.

<sup>5</sup> The two scores were combined to obtain a single indicator about the overall position of political parties in the field.




integration policies, which are a local governments' responsibility (although the Confederation contributes to the funding of projects).

In most of the cities, public information and support services for immigrants are well developed, offering translated documentations and comprising a large range of services, such as general reception offices, information services, language programs, specific social services, intercultural intermediation (Madrid), accommodation services, etc. In Budapest and Lyon, such information and support services are provided by national institutions but in fact are only marginally developed. Two local offices, for example, exist in Lyon and Villeurbanne: their main role is to manage civic and languages courses that are compulsory for newly arrived immigrants.


Immigrants' integration policies are fully carried out in London, Madrid and Zurich. In Zurich, they mainly concern host-country language programmes, education and the participation in the local life. In Madrid, policies are conducted in a wide range of fields: access to resources and local services, social services, co-existence and participation of immigrants in the local life, anti-discrimination policies, employment promotion, etc. In both cities, policies are mainly managed by a specific department dedicated to immigrants' integration. In London, policies are not defined in terms of "integration": in a framework of community cohesion agenda, equality and diversity concerns lead to the adoption of policies aiming at answering the needs of all residents, with a special attention to disadvantaged ones, in particular ethnic minority groups. These policies are integrated within various departments and the special equality units/teams dealing with discrimination in Haringey, Camden and Islington. In Milan, the Municipality has a specific budget for policies related to immigration, but no specific information was available on the orientations of these policies. The case of Lyon and Villeurbanne is again different, as specific policies for immigrants only concern the fight against ethnic discriminations, with the creation of specific committees. Overall, the situation of all cities within the Lyon urban area is rather characterised by a lack of specific policies in this field: the issue is dominantly conceived through a socio-economic approach, not specifically direct to immigrants or ethnic minorities. Lastly, policies in this field do not exist in Budapest.

### Specific POS: development of immigrants' integration policies



As regards the political representation of immigrants, the situation is quite unfavourable in most of the cities, except Zurich. All the bodies and processes that have been set up in this field are new. In Zurich, an advisory council representing immigrants (whose members are selected on the basis of a public call) has been created recently and makes proposals to the local authorities. Its members are conceived as individual participants and not representatives of immigrants' organizations. A similar institution was also instituted in Lyon city in 2005. Although a special attention was given to the representation of migrant groups according to their numerical importance in the city, the appointed members are not supposed to represent either their community or any immigrants' associations. In all the other cities, no similar bodies have been set up. The "Madrid Forum", created in 2006, is a mixed body, gathering representatives of immigrants' associations and other organizations (citizens' associations, trade unions, political parties, etc.). Yet, it is still under construction and does not really operate for the moment. As for the representation of immigrants within political parties, no arrangements exist in most of the cities. There have been formal attempts aiming at improving the presence of immigrants/ethnic minorities within parties only in London and Zurich. In Zurich, such an action has been conducted by the local Socialist party: a "SP-Migration group", essentially gathering second-generation immigrants, were set up and presented candidates at the local elections in 2006 and it plans to do the same for the federal elections. In London, there have been discussions about the presence of ethnic minority candidates among all the major parties, but only the Liberal Democrats have carried out a national campaign on the issue. In addition, local sections of the Labour party, in Islington and Hackney, have sought to encourage the participation of ethnic minority people through forums and information.

**Specific POS: political representation of immigrants  
(councils/boards, political parties)**




\*The overall score for Milan must be considered with cautiousness since the score related to the political parties' arrangements are not available.

Regarding the relations between local powers and minority/immigrants organizations, the situations are quite diverse between cities. In Budapest, since there is no immigrants' integration policies, such organizations are not involved either in the definition or the implementation of local policies. The funding of civil society organizations is project-based, and hence, ethnic organizations are not specifically targeted. In the cities of the Lyon urban areas, organizations presenting themselves according to ethno-cultural lines, generally do not intervene in the definition and implementation of local policies. Indeed, municipalities are often reluctant to cooperate with and finance associations and projects restricted to one particular community. In Milan, the situation is also quite closed. While the Municipality develops specific policies related to immigration, immigrants' organizations are not involved in the definition and implementation of local policies. Some public structures have also been created in the late 1980s at the regional level and late 1990s at the provincial level, which are dedicated to immigration/integration issues and include immigrants' organizations. Yet, they are not active in the city of Milan itself. In Zurich, the City Development department tries to involve all types of organizations, including immigrant ones, to the definition and implementation of its policies, in particular policies aiming at improving disadvantaged districts and favouring integration of immigrants. To this end, organizations are supported and funded on the basis of the quality of their projects, independently of their ethnic composition. The municipality favours projects involving multicultural teams and putting different groups in contact, but projects can also be oriented towards specific immigrant groups.

In Madrid, there is potential for a greater implication of minority/immigrant associations in local policies but the new institution that can foster this implication (the Madrid Forum) is

very new and has not yet developed its intervention. At the moment, the involvement of immigrants' organizations exists only through periodical calls for subsidies to develop projects in specific areas, that is, a limited role if compared to that of NGOs with higher resources.




The most institutionalized and strongest co-operation system between local authorities and minority groups' organizations is in London. In the overall framework of community cohesion agenda, consultation with representatives of religious and ethnic communities, among other actors, is extensively developed through quite formal processes (official partnerships between local authorities and local civil organizations). In addition, the preferential funding of specific disadvantaged groups within local areas, among which ethnic minority groups, is an integral element of policies against social exclusion in London.

Put simply, two common trends can be identified across cities. The involvement of immigrants' organizations in the implementation of local policies, where it exists, is always done in partnership with public institutions (which define overall objectives and follow the implementation of projects). Otherwise, it must be stressed that in all of the cities immigrants are experiencing equal conditions than non-immigrants as regards the requirements for creating organizations and applying for public subsidies.

A quite similar configuration can be identified as far as the involvement of organizations whose activities are specialized in, or have an impact on, immigration/integration issues. Since there are no real policies specific to immigrants' integration at the local level in Budapest and Lyon, such organizations are not (or only marginally) involved in local policies, except in Lyon and Villeurbanne regarding anti-discrimination policies. In Madrid, the consultative bodies including this type of organizations are too recent and not developed yet; the involvement of these organizations in the implementation of some local policies and

services exists but not in a preferential manner and is done in partnership with public institutions. In Milan, these organizations are not involved in the definition of policies, but rather, in their implementation with partnership with local public authorities. In Zurich, the consultation of these organizations is quite developed but not formalized. Lastly, London represent the most open situation due to effective involvement of immigrants' organizations through official plans and partnerships with key local stakeholders.

**Attitudes of local powers towards organizations whose activity is specialized in/has an impact on immigration/integration issues**



As regards the presence of political parties with anti-immigrant positions, the situation is clearly differentiated between 3 groups of cities. In the Lyon urban area, the electoral results of the radical right (mainly the Front National) are very high (going from around 9% to almost 25%), especially in cities of the Lyon agglomeration such as Décines-Charpieu, Meyzieu, Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux. The highest scores of the radical right, however, can be found in Zurich (above 30% in general elections at the local level, 20% in municipal elections). In London and Madrid, the radical right only represents a marginal political actors. Lastly, Milan and Budapest are somewhat in the middle. It should be said that in Budapest the scores of the radical right are higher in the city compared to the national average (6-7% against 4%). In Milan, the radical right attracts between 8 and 10% of the electoral vote in Milan (all types of elections).

**Specific POS: political audience of anti-immigrant  
and radical right parties**

